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Consciousness: Where We Are At
Imants Barušs
Department of Psychology
King’s University College at Western University
Abstract: It is useful every couple of years to take a bird’s eye view of conscious-
ness studies and reflect on what we see. When I look, I still see two streams, one 
of which is the social and political framework for the study of consciousness, and 
the other of which is the substance of what we know about consciousness. The 
former is still largely defined by the extent to which the scientific study of 
consciousness has been freed from a materialist agenda. The latter includes recent 
research into the clarity of cognitive functioning in the absence of sufficient 
neurological support for it, after-death communication, experimenter effects in 
anomalies research, and the psychodynamics of entering transcendent states of 
consciousness. Taken together, these two streams appear to converge on the 
discovery of the depth and meaning of existence that is being revealed through 
consciousness research. 
Key Words: consciousness, qualia, mind, brain, after-death communication, 
experimenter effects, intentionality, nonduality.
At the inaugural conference of the Society for 
Consciousness Studies in 2014, I gave a talk 
titled “A Vision for the Society for Conscious-
ness Studies” (Barušs, 2014) in which I gave 
an overview of the state of consciousness 
studies and the role that the Society could play 
in its development. It is helpful to step back 
every few years to revisit “where we are at” 
with the study of consciousness. A bird’s eye 
view still reveals two streams, one of which is 
the social and political framework within 
which the study of consciousness takes place, 
and the other of which is the actual substance 
of the cutting edge of consciousness studies. I 
will address each of these in turn.
The Study of Consciousness
I will define consciousness as ongoing subjec-
tive experience. More precisely, “conscious-
ness refers to subjective events suffused with 
existential qualia that occur privately for a 
person” (Barušs & Mossbridge, 2017, p. 15). 
“Qualia” refers to the “raw feels” that 
accompanies the occurrence of subject events 
and “the expression existential qualia [refers] 
to the subjective feelings that anything is 
going on at all” (Barušs & Mossbridge, 
2017, p. 15). Qualia pose the “hard 
problem” of consciousness, in that it is 
not clear how they can emerge from a 
physiological or computational substrate.
As I see it, the main problem that is still faced 
by the study of consciousness is the entrench-
ment of materialism in the academy. Material-
ism is a false theory with poor goodness-of-fit 
to empirical evidence. In particular, material-
ism cannot explain matter, materialism cannot 
explain anomalous phenomena, and material-
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ism cannot explain consciousness. It is held in 
place through various mechanisms of social 
influence, such as:
1. inauthenticity, as captured by Martin 
Heidegger’s notion of das Man (Barušs, 
1996);
2. confirmation bias (Barušs & Moss-
bridge, 2017);
3. bias blindness, with materialists being 
less likely than those tending toward tran-
scendent beliefs to have examined their 
own ideas about reality (Barušs & Moore, 
1998);
4. groupthink (Barušs & Mossbridge, 
2017);
5. trance logic (Barušs, 2003). 
This situation can be rectified through authen-
ticity and the engagement of critical thinking 
(Barušs, 1996) and by reclaiming the power 
that has been given over to materialists (cf. 
Kaplan, 2017).
Mind Without a Brain
One area of research that I think is opening up 
a gap between our understanding of con-
sciousness and materialism is the study of 
altered states of consciousness in which there 
is clarity of cognitive functioning without 
sufficient physiological support to explain 
such functioning. These states include termi-
nal lucidity and near-death experiences. Ter-
minal lucidity refers to the occurrence of 
memory and mental clarity prior to death in 
someone whose brain has not supported such 
functioning for some time. Near-death experi-
ences (NDEs) are experiences in which a per-
son is close to death (or thinks that she is close 
to death, such as a fall from a mountain) 
during which time she appears to have had 
mental clarity during vivid experiences of 
various sorts. For instance, in one study, 
45% of par-
ticipants claimed that their thinking was 
“clearer than usual” during their NDE, and 
29% claimed that their thinking was “more 
logical than usual” (Kelly, Greyson, & Kelly, 
2007/2010, p. 386, footnote). In addition, the 
number of cases of apparent veridical percep-
tion during NDEs that are being reported in 
the academic literature appears to be increas-
ing.
The point is this, that if consciousness is a by-
product of brain activity, or computation in-
stantiated in the brain, then degrading the 
brain will cause confusion, delirium, and loss 
of consciousness. A degraded brain, such as in 
cases of terminal lucidity and many NDEs, 
should not be able to support thinking that is 
“clearer” and “more logical” than usual. If 
lucid thinking and occasionally veridical 
anomalous perceptions occur in a brain that is 
demonstrably compromised, then there must 
be another explanation for them. And the 
rather obvious explanation is that conscious-
ness does not need the brain for its existence. 
The point then is to determine the relationship 
between consciousness and the brain and the 
attributes of consciousness when freed from 
attachment to the brain (Barušs & 
Mossbridge, 2017).
After-Death Communication
In a 1973 poll, 27% of respondents believed 
that they had had contact with the dead, with 
51% of widows registering such a belief. A 
decade later those numbers had risen to 42% 
and 67% respectively (Greeley, 1987). Anoth-
er decade later, 74% of widows had “sensed 
the presence of the dead spouse” (Lindstrøm, 
1995, p. 14). In another study it was found the 
49% of next-of-kin of the deceased had had a 
“hallucination or significant dream” of the 
deceased (Barbato et al., 1999, p. 32). In a 
representative Icelandic sample in 1974–75, 
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31% of respondents were reportedly “aware of 
the presence of a deceased person” (Haralds-
son, 2012, p. 1). And, in yet another study, 
48% of pet owners claimed to have sensed 
their pet’s presence (Carmack & Packman, 
2011). Why do we not hear about this inside 
the academy? Where is the research effort to 
try to understand these phenomena?
The conventional understanding is that these 
experiences are hallucinations, delusions, ex-
aggerations, made-up stuff, and so on. One 
problem with such an explanation is that the 
numbers are simply too high. That means that 
these experiences are being reported by people 
who are not otherwise psychotic. And they 
include skeptics such as Michael Shermer, 
who experienced having his grandfather-in-
law’s broken radio suddenly start playing dur-
ing his wedding ceremony (Shermer, 2014).
In his study of after-death communication 
(ADC), Erlendur Haraldsson (2012) found six 
distinctive features from his detailed examina-
tion of 449 accounts among the Icelandic pop-
ulation:
1. Over-representation of those who
died violent deaths.
2. In some cases experiencers had not
known at the time that the deceased
had died.
3. In some cases there have been mul-
tiple witnesses to the sensed presence.
4. There have been encounters with
unknown people who were later identi-
fied.
5. In some cases veridical communica-
tion has occurred.
6. In some cases there have been cor-
rect warnings of danger or apparent
healing.
Similar features have been found by others 
(Barbato et al., 1999; Berger, 1995). They 
pose a serious challenge to conventional ex-
planations but are consistent with the survival 
hypothesis.
Experimenter Effects
I have a reputation in some quarters as being 
the “failure to replicate guy” for failing to 
replicate electronic voice phenomenon 
(Barušs, 2001) and then failing to replicate 
retrocausal recall (Barušs & Rabier, 2014) 
raising considerable concern among their pro-
ponents. Of course, experiments in psycholo-
gy have a poor record of replication anyway, 
with one study finding that 60 of 100 studies 
could not be replicated when a deliberate at-
tempt was made to do so (Makel, Plucker & 
Hegarty, 2012). But the question is, am I cre-
ating a “damping effect” in my lab with my 
skeptical attitude? In other words, am I seeing 
experimenter effects in my lab?
Well, it seems to me that experimenter effects 
are just a tiny window on a global phe-
nomenon. The evidence for anomalous input, 
i.e., remote viewing, and anomalous output,
i.e., remote influencing, is robust. Both are
spatially nonlocal and both can be time-dis-
placed, so that we have spatial and temporal
nonlocality. When we consider them together,
we realize that we are always dynamically
interacting with all events everywhere at all
times! This raises the question of the parame-
ters of such interactions. For instance, under
what conditions can we demonstrate remote
influencing? Under what conditions can re-
mote healing occur? What are the roles of
intention, meaning, will, and love in such in-
teractions? What are the relevant psychologi-
cal variables? I think that what is becoming
apparent is that the ways in which we do re-
search needs to change in order to accommo-
date these anomalous effects.
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Inverting Consciousness
There is considerable interest in persistent 
transcendent states characterized by a funda-
mental sense of well-being (e.g., Martin, 
2014; Taylor, 2017). Given that one generally 
seeks to be in euphoric rather than dysphoric 
states, the issue arises of identifying the most 
effective techniques for creating a shift into 
such states. And given that these persistent 
transcendent states are often nondual, in the 
sense that the subject-object distinction seems 
to disappear, I want to consider for a moment 
the obvious technique of inverting conscious-
ness back upon the subject as a way of break-
ing that duality.
Intentionality is ingrained in our Western in-
tellectual tradition. With the use of the term 
“intentionality” I am referring to the putative 
structure of the mind whereby there is a sub-
jective self which is directed toward the ob-
jects of one’s experience. All three of these, 
the subject, the directedness, and the objects 
are component aspects of intentionality. The 
directedness can be depicted as an arrow from 
the self to an object (cf. Siewert, 2017). Sup-
pose that we somehow shift our “focus” to-
ward the object. Immersion in the object can 
result in flow states whereby a person is ab-
sorbed in the contents of her experience, per-
haps to the point of losing any awareness of a 
self (Csikszentmihalyi, 1988; 1990). Con-
versely, withdrawing identification from the 
objects, such as in mindfulness practices, and 
identifying with the subject can lead to 
disidentification, dissociation, and derealiza-
tion, that can be experienced as euphoric or 
dysphoric (cf. Wallace, 2012, American Psy-
chiatric Association, 2013). In both cases, 
however, our subjective experience is still 
dual; it still has intentional structure.
Now, what happens if we deliberately attempt 
to invert consciousness by turning the arrow 
of intentionality back upon the subject? On the 
face of it, that seems like an impossible task. 
Clearly the subject as a subject cannot become 
an object. According to Alan Wallace, in the 
Dzogchen tradition of Tibetan Buddhism, it is 
not an impossible task. We are to just do it 
(Wallace, 2016). So what happens?
Well, we can begin by using our ordinary sen-
sory modalities to perceive what is happening 
within the interior of the body. This involves 
touch, proprioception, balance through the 
vestibular system, nociception, and interocep-
tion (de Vignemont, 2016) and, more 
generally, turning attention to the interior of 
the body can sometimes lead to an unveiling 
of intentionality “as if awareness is digging 
into, folding onto, or being sucked into the 
phenomenologically material ‘stuff’ of the 
meditating subject” (Louchakova-Schwartz, 
2016, p. 265) with the attendant occurrence of 
various transcendent experiences.
We can also conceptualize this inversion of 
consciousness as using whatever perceptual 
mechanisms we use when we are remote 
viewing. Does remote viewing always have 
intentional structure? For James Carpenter 
(2012), we are already always engaged in 
remote viewing and influencing at a noncon-
scious level and such abilities may become 
engaged as we seek to perceive the subjective 
element of our consciousness. If nonconscious 
remote viewing is nondual, perhaps that nond-
uality can surface in the attempt to perceive 
the subjective element of consciousness.
But is inversion even perceptual at all, or does 
it primarily involve cognitive mechanisms, 
perhaps even some form of “direct knowing,” 
whatever that might be? Upon careful 
scrutiny, the usual distinctions between per-
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ception, cognition, subject, object, conscious, 
and nonconscious, start to blur. And even 
though the psychodynamics are unclear, it 
appears that, in some cases, inverting con-
sciousness, whatever that is, shatters the inten-
tional structure, with the result that a person 
ends up in a nondual state of consciousness 
(Lingpa, 2016; Merrell-Wolff, 1937/2017).
Conclusion
I have considered the study of consciousness, 
mind without a brain, after-death communica-
tion, experimenter effects, and inverting con-
sciousness. What can we say about this cur-
rent edge of consciousness research? It seems 
to me that materialism stripped life of depth, 
richness, and meaning. However, the more we 
distance ourselves from materialism and the 
more deeply we investigate consciousness 
using different modalities, the more depth, 
richness, and meaning are restored to reality. 
Rather than being boring and meaningless, 
reality is turning out to be meaningful and 
interesting. Allowing ourselves to shift from 
the former to the latter can be an act of will 
that constitutes a continuous awakening. 
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